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No. 8, 699 (C.C. Ind. 1843); Clanton v. Barnes, 5o Ala. 26o (1873); Yeatman v. Cullen, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 240 (1839); see Brabston v. Gibson, 9 How. (U.S.) 263 (1850);
Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel Corp., 267 U.S. 22 (1924).
But where the indorsement of an instrument payable in New York was invalid under the law of the place of the instrument at the time of the negotiation but valid
as tested by the law of New York, the indorsement was held sufficient to give the
indorsee a valid claim against the maker, the court, however, expressing doubt as to
whether the indorser acquired a claim against the indorsee. Everett v. Vendryes, 19
N.Y. 436 (1859). Even though § 72 of the Bills of Exchange Act has no counterpart in
the Negotiable Instruments Law, it would seem that the American courts are justified
on common law principles in reaching the same result as the English cases.
Modern writers favor the rule under which the acquisition of title to the negotiable
instrument and the debt embodied therein is governed by the law of the situs of the
instrument. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (1927), 363; Lorenzen, Conflict of Laws Relating to Bills and Notes (1919), 14o; Restatement, Conflict of Laws (I934), §§ 52, 262.
This rule is all the more desirable since it is identical with that of the Geneva Convention on the Conflict of Laws as to Bills of Exchange of June 7, 193 o , art. 3 and 4 (see
Hudson and Feller, The International Unification of Laws Concerning Bills of Exchange, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 333 (i93o)), as well as that of the Geneva Convention on
the Conflict of Laws as to Checks of March 19, 1931, art. 4 and 5 (Feller, The International Unification of Laws Concerning Checks, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 668 (i93i)). The
result of the instant case is unique in subjecting the drawer of a check to double liability under a single claim. This result can perhaps be jiistified since there is no reason
why the risk of loss and negotiation of an instrument under a forged indorsement should
be less for the maker than for subsequent holders if the instrument was intended to be
negotiated abroad.
Constitutional Law-Chain Store License Tax-[United States].-A West Virginia
statute (W.Va. Acts 1933, c. 36), imposing a graduated license tax on chain stores with
a maximum of $250 for each unit over seventy-five, defined store as "any store or mercantile establishment... in which goods, wares, or merchandise are sold." Plaintiff
operating a chain of a thousand and three gasoline stations filed a bill to restrain defendant, tax commissioner, from paying into the state treasury the taxes which plaintiff had paid under protest. Held, (four justices dissenting) that plaintiff's gasoline
stations were "stores" within the statutory definition, and that, despite the fact that
gasoline chains, which handled but 5% in amount of the total chain business, paid
under the statute 85% of the total chain store license tax, this was not such an arbitrary discrimination against gasoline chains as to violate the fourteenth amendment to
the Constitution. Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 55 Sup. Ct. 333 (1935), reversing
6 F. Supp. 494 (S.D.W.Va. 1934).
The first attempts at chain store taxation were attacked as an unconstitutional
denial of equal protection of the laws because they were thought not to satisfy the
orthodox rule that classification for taxation must be reasonable and rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation so that all persons similarly circumstanced are treated alike. Becker and Hess,
The Chain Store License Tax and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 No. Car. L. Rev. 115
(1928); 31 Col. L. Rev. i45 (ig3i); 44 Harv. L. Rev. 456 (ig3i); 8o Univ. Pa. L. Rev.

RECENT CASES
289 (1931). Cf. F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Va., 253 U.S. 412 (1920); Air-Way Electrical
Appliance Corp. v. Day, 266 U.S. 71 (1924); Schlesinger v. Wis., 270 U.S. 230 (1926);
Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32 (1928); 43 A. L. R. 592 (1926).
However, since State Board of Tax Comm. of Ind. v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931) recognized that chain stores enjoy sufficient economic advantages over "independents"
to justify special taxation, graduated and non-graduated chain store taxes have been
sustained. Southern Grocery Stores v. So. Car. Tax Comm., 55 F. (2d) 931 (E. D. S. C.
1932) (maximum unit tax $x5o; gas stations excluded); Penny Stores, Inc. v. Mitchell,
59 F. (2d) 789 (S.D. Miss. 1932), appeal dismissed 287 U.S. 672 (1932) (higher rate of
income tax on chains with more than five units); Liggett Co. v. Lee, Iog Fla. 477, 149
So. 8 (1933) (maximum unit tax $5o; gas stations excluded); J. C. Penney Co. v. Diefendorf, 32 P. (2d) 784 (Idaho 1934) (maximum unit tax $5oo; gas stations excluded);
Safeway Stores v. Diefendorf, 32 P. (2d) 798 (1934) (same statute as preceding case).
Contra,F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Harrison,172 Ga. 179, 156 S.E. 904 (1931); cf. Liggett
Co. v. Lee. 288 U.S. 517 (1933) (tax unconstitutional only in so far as it imposed higher
rates for chains operating in more than one county), reversing in part Liggett Co. v.
Amos, 104 Fla. 6og, 141 So. 153 (1932); see 8o Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 289 (1931). And a
statute which in effect taxes chain stores by imposing a license tax on merchants operating distributing houses is not a denial of equal protection. GreatAtlantic and Pacific
Tea Co. v. Morrissett, 58 F. (2d) 991 (E.D.Va. 1931); aff'd 284 U.S. 584 (1931); Commonwealth v. Bibee Grocery Co., 153 Va. 935, 151 S.E. 293 (1930); 73 A. L. R. 1481
(1931); 85 A. L. R. 736 (1933).
The principal case does not involve the question whether a chain store tax, as such,
is unconstitutional. It involves, rather, the question whether a graduated chain store
tax, based solely on the number of units, disregarding income on valuation, resulting
in gasoline chains paying a percentage of the tax grossly disproportionate to their percentage of chain store business, is an arbitrary discrimination against gasoline chains.
Cf. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933) (classification placing heavier burden on
chains in more than one county is unconstitutional); Air-way ElectricAppliance Corp.
v. Day, 266 U.S. 71, 83 (1924) (a tax of foreign corporation based solely on number of
shares of stock is unconstitutional). Chain distribution of gasoline is effected by a
larger number of units with relatively smaller individual earning capacity compared
with chains for the sale of other commodities, which have fewer units each with a
greater earning power and investment. See tables in StandardOil Co. of N.J. v. Fox,
6 F. Supp. 494 (S.D.W.Va. 1934). Consequently the argument of the economic advantage of chain stores, used to sustain the separate classification of chain stores in
the Jackson case, would not seem to justify the classification in the present case unless
it can be argued that usually an increase in number means an increase in economic advantage, so that the basis of classification is not clearly unreasonable even though it
may be harsh in the given case and prevent a profit. (In the principal case most of
plaintiff's stations although earning less than $ioo each per annum had to pay the
maximum tax of $250.) Cf. Packardv. Banton, 264 U.S. 140 (1924); Roberts & Schaeffer Co. v. Emerson, 271 U.S. 50 (1926); People of State of N.Y. v. Latrobe, 279 U.S. 421
(1929); J. C. Penney Co. v. Diefendorf,32 P. (2d) 784 (Idaho 1934).
It being sufficient that a classification has reasonable relation to some permitted
end of governmental regulation, a classification based only on number would not seem
to deny the equal protection of the laws; for it can be said that restriction of the nu-
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merical growth of chains regardless of their increase in capital or income is a permissible
policy of taxation. Cf. American Refining Co. v. Louisiana,179 U.S. 89 (igoo); Watson
v. State Comptroller of the State of New York, 254 U.S. 122 (1920); Roberts & Schaeffer
Co. v. Emerson, 271 U.S. 5o (1926); Lawrence v. State Tax Comm. of Miss., 286 U.S. 276
(1932). The Indiana court appears to have taken this view, saying "chains are chains"
and therefore gasoline stations may be included in a chain store classification. Midwestern Petroleum Corp. v. State Board of Tax. Comm. 187 N.E. 882 (Ind. 1933).
Since gasoline filling stations are subject to excise and other taxes a chain store
license tax expressly exempting them is constitutional. Liggett Co. v. Lee 288 U.S. 517
(1933); Southern Grocery Stores v. S.C. Tax Comm., 55 F. (2d) 931 (E.D.S.C. 1932);
GreatAtlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Maxwell, 199 N.C. 433, 154 S.E. 838 (193o); J. C.
Penney Co. v. Diefendorf, 32 P. (2d) 784 (Idaho 1934). But see Winter v. Barrett,352
Ill. 441, 186 N.E. 113 (1933) (holding unconstitutional an occupational tax which
exempted gas stations); see 89 A. L. R. 1432 (1934). In absence of express exclusion
it has been held that these distinctions should cause gas stations not to be considered
"stores" within the act. Wadhams Oil Co. v. State, 210 Wis. 448, 245 N.W. 646 (1932).
See note, 43 Yale L. J. 1022 (I934); cf. McKenney v. City Council of Alexandria,
147 Va. 157, 136 S.E. 588 (1927) (holding that a gasoline station is not within the scope
of a tax on "all engaged in business of merchants"). However, the Indiana statute held
constitutional in the Jackson case though not specifically mentioning gas stations, was
construed to include them as "stores." Midwestern Petroleum Corp. v. State Board of
Tax Comm., 187 N.E. 882 (Ind. 1933); see Zimmerman, The Challenge of the Chain
Store Distribution (3931) 52; cf. Gunther v. Atlantic Refining Co., 277 Pa. 289, 121 At.53 (1923) (holding that a filling station is within the purview of a covenant against
store buildings). The further fact that the West Virginia Legislature rejected a provision excluding gas stations when the act was proposed may have influenced the court
in the principal case.
The severity of the tax in the principal case and the existence of doubt as to including gasoline stations within the construction of "stores" under the act may indicate
that the Supreme Court will go far to sustain the constitutionality and extensive application of chain store legislation in the future.
Corporations-Interested Director Voting for Salary of Officer-[Illinois].-The
board of directors of a corporation, pursuant to its by-laws, by resolution had fixed
the salaries of its officers, including that of the plaintiff, the president, who was also a
director. Subsequently the plaintiff and other officers informally agreed to accept reduced salaries. The corporation having paid salaries at the reduced rate, plaintiff
sought to recover the difference between the salary paid him and the salary as fixed by
the board. Held, the record not disclosing what directors had voted for the resolution,
plaintiff could not recover without showing either that he had not voted for it or that
his vote was unnecessary for its passage. Moreover the agreement among the officers
being for the benefit of the corporation, it could use it as a defense to plaintiff's claim.
Connors v. Swords Co., 276 Ill. App. 318 (1934).
A director, being a fiduciary to his corporation, is disqualified from voting on any
matter in which he is interested; any transaction in which he is interested is voidable
whether or not the transaction is fair, if authorized or ratified only by including his
vote. Consumers' Ice & Coal Co. v. Security Bank & Trust Co., 17o Ark. 530, 28o S.W.

